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NOTES
the minds of the jurors, thus preventing the fair administration of
criminal justice. It potentially reverses the presumption of innocence
to one of guilt. The effectiveness of the exclusionary order as a remedy
for press abuses is, however, open to doubt. Exclusion may tend to
preserve the presumption of innocence to a degree, but it fails to
counteract the evil of "trial by newspaper" which arises in many cases
before the trial begins. The order tends to punish the innocent, for
all newspapers are not guilty of this vice in the sensational cases. Thus
while the exclusion protects the accused's right to a fair trial, it may
unnecessarily encroach on freedom of the press and the public right
to know and participate in the governmental process. At the present
time, only through the weighing process and a liberal policy towards
intervention as amicus curiae by representative members of the public,
where rights are threatened to be foreclosed, can the public's right to
know be protected against arbitrary restriction.
TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE: MANAGEMENT PREROGATIVE
VS. JOB SECURITY
Recent congressional hearings1 have focused attention on the grow-
ing problems wrought by technological changes 2 and consequent displace-
ment. Because its purpose is to increase productivity and profits by
reduced labor costs,' technological change is opposed by some fearful
determine whether there has been a violation of a constitutional right. Bridges v.
California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941). "The courts are then limited to doing what they can
lo insulate jurors from the prejudicial effect of such publicity, as by cautionary instruc-
tions or by the granting of continuances, or in some cases granting a change of venue."
Delaney v. United States, supra, at 113. The courts have, perhaps, found in exclusion
an effective deterrent to "trial by newspaper."
1. H.R. REs. 221, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955). "Resolution creating a select com-
mittee to conduct an investigation and study of the effects of increasing automation
upon the American economy." 101 CoNG. REc. 4180 (daily ed. April 21, 1955). The
committee held hearings in October 1955 at which representatives of management and
labor testified.
2. Technological change is used in a broad sense and in this note and means the
use of labor saving devices and all types of modem manufacturing methods. These
methods include automation, mechanization, and improved operational and organizational
techniques. The discussion is chiefly related to the mass production manufacturing plants.
3. "The Annual Improvement Factor . . . recognizes that a continuing improve-
ment in the standard of living of employees depends upon technological progress, better
tools, methods, processes, and equipment, and a cooperative attitude on the part of all
parties in such progress. It further recognizes the principle that to produce more with
the same amount of human effort is a sound economic and social objective." 5 CCH
LAB. L. RE:P. (4th ed.) ff 59923.095 (1955) (Ford Motor Co.-UAW Contract).
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workers and their labor unions ;4 at the other extreme are those of man-
agement who refuse to recognize the interest of labor in preserving em-
ployees' rights of job security. Progressive labor groups know that
complete automation is limited to a fairly small portion of industry, that
it will be comparatively slow in evolution,5 and that it eventually will
result in more jobs and greater consumer demand.6 Moreover labor sav-
ing devices bring higher wages, less effort on the job, greater fringe
benefits, and hasten the possibility of a shorter work week.7 These long
range benefits, however, do not lessen the severity of the economic and
psychological impact which technological displacement, however tem-
porary its duration, has upon the wage earner.8
The employer is required to recognize labor organizations for pur-
poses of bargaining with respect to employee wages and working condi-
tions.9 Each concession by management to employees strengthens labor's
claim to joint administration of the plant and, consequently, limits the
area in which management is free to exercise its powers unilaterally."
Thus, even though management specifically reserves the right to change
operating and manufacturing methods, the NLRB and arbitrators have
shown a tendency to limit the unilateral exercise of these functions be-
4. For discussions of labor opposition to technological change by means of work
restrictions and featherbedding, See Selekman, Productivit3-and Labor Relations, 27
HARV. Bus. REv. 373 (1949) ; Aaron, Governmental Restraints on Featherbedding, 5 STAN.
L. REv. 680 (1953). A recent case illustrating one union's resistance to modern methods
is Austin v. Painters District Council, 339 Mich. 462, 64 N.W.2d 550 (1954), 53 MicH. L.
REv. 486 (1955).
5. Diebold, Automation-The New Technology, HARV. Bus. REV., Nov.-Dec. 1953,
p. 63, 71. _
6. Phillip Murray, the late CIO president stated: "I do n6t know of a single
solitary instance where a great technological gain has taken place in the United States
of America that it has actually thrown people out of work. I do not know of it-I am
not aware of it-because the industrial revolution that has taken place in the United
States in the past 25 years has brought into the employment field an additional 20 million
people." 101 CoNG. REC. A1521 (daily ed. March 8, 1955).
7. See Business Week, Oct. 1, 1955, p. 75. One view is that in the automobile
industry the "high wage and fringe costs imposed by the UAW, combined with the
fierce competition, makes further technological progress both necessary and inevitable."
Northrup, The UAW's Inflhuence on Automotive Management Decisions, 78 MONTHLY
LAB. REv. 170, 173 (1955).
8. The Wall Street Journal, Oct. 18, 1955, p. 24, col. 1; The Wall Street Journal,
Oct. 25, 1955, p. 2, col. 2.
9. "Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through regresentatives of their own choos-
ing. . .. ." Representatives designated . . . shall be the exclusive representatives . . .
for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of em-
ployment, or other conditions of employment.... .LMRA, 61 STAT. 140, 143 (1947),
29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 159 (1952).
10. For a commentary on this proposition in one industry, See Northrup, supra
note 7.
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cause of their effect on areas of joint control under the agreement."'
The most significant limitation on management's right to effect techno-
logical changes is job security. 2
Job Security
Seniority, the status achieved by employees through length of service,
gives rights under the contract with respect to jobs; it probably has done
more to encourage union membership than any other protective feature
of the labor agreement." Seniority was, at first, a means by which em-
ployers favored older, experienced, and dependable workers. By giving
seniority privileges, the employer could reduce employee turnover, pro-
tect his training investment, encourage skilled workers to remain with
him, 4 and reduce their desire to take action which might jeopardize
their job security.' In the absence of other criteria, seniority provided
an understandable basis for promotion and layoff. 6 As the principle of
collective bargaining became recognized, and ultimately required by the
Wagner Act, 7 these privileges were converted into valuable contract
rights which insured employee job status.' Seniority rights were ex-
tended to the unskilled worker who, because of his weaker bargaining
position, had been more subject to arbitrary action.' 9
When skills, which formerly offered a ba*sis for job security, are
eliminated by advancing mechanization, the desire and need to provide
job security is increased. This, perhaps, largely explains why seniority
is well established, both as a bargaining subject and as a feature of plant
management;2 its inherent complexities 2 and resistance to its strict
11. See discussion p. 394-96 infra.
12. The limitation results from the personnel movements which naturally arise from
technological change. It has been categorically stated that seniority tends to cause
employee opposition to technological change. Mitchem, Seniority Clauses in Collective
Bargaining Agreements, 21 ROCKY MT. L. REv. 156, 326 (1949).
13. "The promise of job 'ownership' . . . or the complete elimination of 'favor-
itism'" was this encouragement. Knowlton, Recent Problems in Arbitration of Seniority
Dispttes. 9 ARB. J. (n.s.) 194 (1954).
14. LAPP, How TO HANDLE PROBLEMS OF SENIORITY 2-3 (1946).
15. Certain actions -by employees can result in the loss of.seniority under contract
provisions. Id. at 61-63. "Seniority is not lost by strikes or lockout." Id. at 64.
16. "Since in most cases management has no really effective means for measuring
the relative ability of the vast majority of its unskilled or semi-skilled workers, it may
have little objection to considering length of service as a major factor governing layoffs
and rehiring." HARmIsON AND COLEMAN, GOALS AND STRATEGY IN COLLECTIVE BAR-
GAINING 39 (1951).
17. NLRA 49 STAT 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-166 (1952).
18. LAPP. op. cit. sutra note 14, at 3.
19. Id. at 9.
20. HARBISON AND COLEMAN, op. cit. supra note 16, at 39.
21. For a comprehensive outline of seniority provisions, See Mitchem, supra note 12.
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application,2 2 however, raise many problems in negotiation and adminis-
tration.2"
Seniority provisions and their application are as varied as are the
different types of industries and job classifications. 4 The degree to
which seniority is used as the basis for contract rights depends on its
practicability, the bargaining power of the labor representatives, and the
management's acceptance of the principle.2 5 In the typical agreement the
exercise of seniority rights is conditioned upon requirements of skill and
ability. Because of the difficulty of evaluating these factors,26 they are
probably the most arbitrated part of seniority plans. Management would
like maximum emphasis on skill and ability, while unions usually attempt
to secure maximum use of seniority for job-bidding, transfer rights, and
upgrading.
2
Another important factor in seniority plans is the unit in which
seniority rights accrue. Where occupations are similar and skills are
fairly equal, a broad seniority unit, such as the whole plant, may be
adopted.2" Where operations are complex, the seniority unit must be
narrower and seniority rights typically exist within a department or a
similar unit.29 Management prefers departmental seniority in order to
establish competition between similar skills and to prevent excessive
bumping, numerous transfers, and consequent high training costs.2 " From
the employee point of view a broad seniority unit provides greater job
22. See Fairweather, Seniority Provisions in Labor Contracts: Social and Ecowinic
Consequences, 1 DEPAUL L. REV. 191 (1952). The author criticizes strict seniority and
advocates maximum use of ability.
23. Brown, A New Technique in Seniority Administration, 9 IND. & LAB. REL. REV.
32 (1955).
24. LAPP, op. cit. szpra note 14, at 10.
25. Collective bargaining is a process in which labor's desire for broad seniority
and management's desire for plant efficiency is attempted to be reconciled. U.S. BUEAU
OF LABOR STATIsTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. No. 908-11, COLLEcTIVE BARGAINING PRO-
VISIONS, SENIORITY 14, 15 (1949). Seniority is often adjusted for local situations.
"Seniority shall be by . . . groups of departments or plant wide, as may be negotiated
locally in each plant. . . ." 5 CCH LAB. L. REP. (4th ed.) ff 59905.20 (1955) (General
Motors Corp-UAW Contract).
26. For discussions of the variations in ability-seniority provisions, See Knowlton,
supra note 13; Note, 38 VA. L. REv. 655 (1952).
27. U.S. BUREAU OF LAROR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. No. 908-11, COL-
LECTIV BARGAINING PROVISIONS, SENIORITY 2 (1949).
28. Contract Clauses on Seniority as a Factor in Layoffs, 78 MONTHLY LAB. REV.
766, 767 (1955).
29. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DRP'T OF LABOR, BULL. No. 908-11,
COLLECTiVE BARGAINING PROVISIONS, SENIORITY 14-15 (1949). Departmental seniority
is more common. The seniority unit is dependent on the size of the plant, scale of
operations, skill requirements, diversity of processes, and interchangeability of types
of work. Id. at 14.
30. Ibid.
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security because, in the event of displacement,"' it gives those with senior-
ity some cushion and a wider area in which to assert job rights.
When expansion accompanies modernization, the employer is in a
position to absorb employees displaced from a particular operation. 2 If
no contractual obligation exists, the employer may consider only the ability
and morale of the workers; he would prefer to place his most able em-
ployees where he desires3" and retrain only the workers who would best
benefit his business for the longest time. 4 Very likely, he would attempt
to keep wages and job classifications as nearly the same as possible. 5
Where there is no expansion, however, contract provisions36 and economic
conditions may prevent a ready answer to the problem of the displaced
worker. By limiting the unilateral exercise of management prerogatives
which affect job security, unions have attempted to anticipate and pre-
vent displacement hardships. 7
31. Mitchem, supra note 12, at 161 (1949).
32. Without the productivity benefits there would 'be higher prices and less of a
tendency for the economy to expand. This is the case in Great Britain where innovations
are opposed. U.S. News and World Report, Feb. 18, 1955, p. 92-95. Firms which do
not adopt new techniques may be forced out of business by competitors who do. Weinberg,
A Review of Automatic Technology, 78 MONTELY LAB. REv. 637, 644 (1955). Changes
are usually introduced in times of high demand when the chances for expansions are
greatest. Segal, Factors in Wage Adinstments to Technological Change, 8 IND. & LAB.
RE. REv. 217, 224 (1954).
33. "The transferring of employees is the sole responsibility of Management sub-
ject to the following: (a) In the advancement of employees to higher paid jobs when
ability, merit and capacity are equal, employees with the longest seniority will be given
preference. (b) It is the policy of Management to cooperate in every practical way
with employees who desire transfers to new positions or vacancies in their department."
5 CCH LAB. L. REP. (4th ed.) ff 59905.22 (1955) (General Motors Corp.-UAW Con-
tract),
34. SLICETER, UNION POLICIES AND INDUSTRIAL MANAGEMENT 279 (1941).
35. One company expresses this policy: "In lieu of severance allowance, the Com-
pany may offer an eligible employee a job, in at least the same job class for which he is
qualified, in the same general locality. . . ." 5 CCH LAB. L. REP. (4th ed.) ff 59908.77
(1955) (United States Steel Corp.-USW Contract).
36. Interdepartmental transfer is a method of allowing displaced workers to find
jobs in new departments. Job bidding and posting plans allow the employee to choose a
position if he has the requisite length of service and ability. Some contracts allow bump-
ing only in the case of technological change. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 15 Lab. Arb.
659 (1950).
37. "A wide variety of provisions dealing with employment problems created by
technological change are to be found in collective-bargaining agreements in many in-
dustries. They range from outright prohibitions against the introduction of technological
changes . . . to elaborate arrangements covering such matters as notification by the
employer to the union of proposed changes. . . ." Aaron, supra note 1, at 688. "When
new type machinery is to be introduced, the Employer shall notify the Union.. . . The
parties shall meet and discuss the proposed installation . . . and such discussion shall
include the proposed duties and job assignments. . . ." 5 CCH LAB. L. REP. (4th ed.)
1 59932.19 (1954) (American Woolen Co.-CIO Textile Workers Contract).
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Conflict of Management Prerogative and Job Security
The unit of seniority may prove to be a substantial obstacle to ab-
sorption on the basis of seniority. This problem arose, for example, when
a manufacturer laid off long service employees with only departmental
seniority after the operations they had been performing were transferred
to a new type of machine in another department.38 During negotiations
to determine whether "employees affected can be retained in the service
of the company,"39 the company held firmly to the position that allowing
the employees to follow their former jobs to the new machines would vio-
late the departmental seniority provisions. Management did not agree
with the union's contention that retention of long service employees was
of more importance than maintenance of strict departmental seniority."
When the grievance of the employees affected was taken to arbitration,
the arbitrator referred the parties to the bargaining table.41
Even though plant modernization does not result in actual worker
displacement, changes which alter departmental organization will affect
the relative standing of employees on the seniority roster. In one instance
where a steel company split a department for purposes of improved oper-
ational management due to a difference in work done between two
groups,4 2 a unilateral change was effected in the employees' seniority
unit and in their relative standing on the seniority roster. The company
maintained that its action was taken in the interests of efficient operation
and was justified under the management prerogative clause of the con-
tract. It was the union's position that because of the effect on seniority
rights, the change must be submitted to prior bargaining rather than to
subsequent arbitration. The contract provided for departmental seniority
units to be determined by management and employee grievance commit-
tees from the departments involved. The arbitrator was unwilling to
recognize that this provision imposed a limitation on management's right
38. Robershaw-Fulton Controls Co., 9 Lab. Arb. 380, 384 (1948).
39. The contract provided for negotiation "if, due to the introduction of new
machines, methods, apparatus, etc. there is a substantial reduction of force in a depart-
ment. . . ." Id. at 385.
40. Manipulation of seniority provisions during collective bargaining due to internal
union politics is an interesting sidelight. See Sayles, Seniority: An Inter al Union
Problem, HARv. Bus. REv., Jan.-Feb. 1952, p. 55.
41. "[The] employees in the Corrugating Department do not have the right to
exercise their seniority rights in the Hydraulic Dept., unless the Company and the
Union see fit to alter the contract terms by further negotiation and agreement" Rober-
shaw-Fulton Controls Co., 9 Lab. Arb. 380, 386 (1948).
In other cases the elimination of a skilled worker from a job simplified by new
methods or the complete elimination of a job have been ruled to be management preroga-
tives on the basis of plant efficiency. McDonnell Aircraft Corp., 21 Lab. Arb. 424 (1953)
West Virginia Pulp and Paper Co., 15 Lab. Arb. 754 (1950).
42. Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co., 16 Lab. Arb. 394 (1951).
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to effect changes but recommended that the parties negotiate on the ques-
tion of the seniority rights of the affected employees.
A similar situation involved the purchase of a new plant;4'--in the
process of moving and modernizing the entire industrial operation, new
departments were created and others were split. The contract prbvided
that seniority rights would accompany the employee in departmental
transfers made by mutual agreement. The union, without questioning
the companies motive for effecting the changes, maintained that the action
resulted in a unilateral alteration of the employees' seniority status and
violated the spirit of the contract."4 The-arbitrator, emphasizing the im-
portance of seniority rights to job security, 5 found that the company's
unilateral action was not authorized and held that the company must
negotiate the effects of the changes upon the-employees' seniority.
The recognition by management of an obligation and need ,for, prior
negotiation may not solve all problems. The Bethlehem Steel Company,
the United Steel Workers of America, and five locals recognized'that the
company's modernization program would jeopardize the job security of
many long service employees.46 Extensive negotiations were carried out
to allow .employees with seniority to transfer from. abandoned mills to
the new plant. An expanded seniority unit and transfer plan was devised;
but, even then, a displaced employee's grievance was taken t6 arbitration.
The arbitrator noted that the understanding of the parties contemplated
that seniority workers from the abandoned mills would be able to bump
workers in the new plant and that persons displaced must abide by. the
terms of the agreement."' Planning does not obviate displacement but
insures maximum protection for senior employees.
A trend toward decentralization and relocation of plants in connec-
tion with technological improvements"8 is a source of further concern to
labor. 9 Plant moves for valid economic reasons are within the preroga-
43. Jenkins Bros., 16 Lab. Arb. 261 (1951).
44. Ibid.
45. "A collective bargaining agreement is an instument one of the basic purposes
of whichis job security..... This is a major working condition for which theUnion
,bargains and which it strives to protect in the agreement." Id, at 263. .,
46. Bethlehem Steel Co., 21 Lab. Arb. 599 (1953).
47. Id. at 602.
48. It is often easier to modernize a new plant than to alter an old one. Saturday
Review, Jan. 22, 1955, p. 38. See discussion p. supra.
49. The UAW brought an action to attempt to prevent the Ford Motor Company
from engaging in a decentralization program. In an elaborate brief the union stated
that valuable, hard-won contract benefits, including wages, fringe 'benefits and seniority
were jeopardized by the company policy of gradually moving its operations from the
bargaining area. In dismissing the complaint the judge discounted the union's allegation
that there was misrepresentation or an implied condition against decentralization. Man-
agement's prerogative of running the business included the right to decentralize, and the
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
tive of management,5" but the duty to bargain requires that management
inform the union and negotiate the problems of displaced workers."
Similarly, even though a company is not obligated to bargain about the
discontinuance of a department for bona fide economic reasons, the con-
tract may require bargaining about the reemployment of the displaced
men. In such a case the company's duty to the employees may be fulfilled
by adequate notice of the displacement and an offer to absorb the workers
in other departments as soon as possible. 2 Unilateral changes must be
paralleled with reasonable solutions of employee problems.
The extent to which job security impinges upon management pre-
rogative is not an appropriate question for determination in the griev-
ance procedure.5 " The answer should not be delayed until a change is
contract was held to have reserved the prerogative. Local 600, United Automobile
Workers, CIO v. Ford Motor Co., 113 F. Supp. 834 (E.D. Mich. 1953). In subsequent
negotiations a provision for automatically extending the union agreement to new units
of the company was included. 5 CCH LAB. L. REP. (4th Ed.) 11 59923.005 (1955) (Ford
Motor Co.-UAW Contract).
50. When a textile company moved its plant from New England to the South, the
NLRB ruled that the move amounted to a refusal to bargain. It required the company
to reinstate and transfer former employees at company expense. This was reversed on
appeal; the court held that the plant had not "run away" from union difficulty. The
decision to move the plant was made in good faith and, the total New England layoff
was for .valid economic reasons. The trend of the textile industry to move to the South
was noted. Mount Hope Finishing Co. v. NLRB, 211 F.2d 365 (4th Cir. 1954). See
E-Z Mills Inc., 106 N.L.R.B. 1039 (1953). For a discussion of the attitude of the
NLRB toward the relocation or sale of industry, See Note, 5 WESTERN RES. L. REV. 84
(1953).
51. California Portland Cement Co., 101 N.L.R.B. 1436 (1952); Brown Truck
and Trailer Manufacturing Co., 106 N.L.R.B. 999 (1953); Auto Stove Works, 81
N.L.R.B. 1203 (1949); Rome Products Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 1217 (1948).
52. National Gas Co., 99 N.L.R.B. 273 (1952). For a comprehensive review of
management functions which are limited by the LMRA, See Lang, Unilateral Changes
by Management as a Violation of the Ditty to Bargain Collectively, 9 Sw. L. J. 276
(1955).
53. Arbitration should be limited to the narrow issues specified in the contract.
Broad questions of technique should not enter into the grievance procedure. Often neither
arbitrators nor union representatives have the technical knowledge to participate in
management functions. Complicated engineering and financial decisions can best be made
by persons trained for the jobs. The effects of these decisions on plant personnel are
better subjects for negotiations. Some arbitrators are unwilling to enter this sphere
and recommend that the parties negotiate. See discussion p. 394-95 sutpra. "Some em-
ployers feel too that arbitrators, in emphasizing job security as against plant efficiency,
have imposed technical rules, such as burden of proof, against the employer to such an
extent that he is unable to sustain his case against the employee and hence the award
reverses management." Ferguson, An Appraisal of Labor Arbitration, A Management
Viewpoint, 8 IND. & LAB. REL. REV. 79, 82 (1954).
In one case a union failed in an attempt to require management to arbitrate in the
case of displacement by technological change. The court found nothing in the agreement
to require grievance procedure treatment of this type of discharge. "Such job eliminations
are the normal and expected incidents of the modernization of industrial methods."
Industrial Trades Union v. Woonsocket Dyeing Co., 122 F.Supp. 872, 876 (1954).
For a review of subjects frequently excluded from arbitration, See U.S. BuRvAu OF
LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR BULL. No. 908-16, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING PROVISIONS,
proposed because the atmosphere of dispute is not conducive to intelli-
gent planning, and hastily drawn solutions are inadequate. Definitive
contract provisions are desirable to aid management in necessary planning
and to assist employees in understanding their rights.54 These can best
be achieved through mutual understanding and cooperation at the bar-
gaining table. 5
Contract Provisions
Union contracts sometimes contain specific provisions which affect
management's right to rel9 cate plants; these may range from total pro-
hibition to a requirement of prior negotiation.5" Prohibition is an ex-
treme measure of doubtful enforceability." Although prior negotiation
affords a process for working out the problems when they arise, more
adequate employee protection may be gained by a provision extending
hiring preference, transfer rights, retention of fringe benefits during
layoff, severence pay, or unemployment compensation to the occasion
of temporary or permanent displacement.58
Practical methods of interdepartmental and interplant transfer have
been devised in some contracts to facilitate the absorption process. The
recently negotiated contract of the Ford Motor Company allows affected
employees to transfer without loss of seniority when operations are moved
to new plants. " When a seniority unit is permanently discontinued, em-
ployees are allowed to bump on a plant-wide basis; workers whose senior-
ity does not give them priority within their job classifications may bump
probationary employees, first, on a plant-wide, and then on a company-
GRIEVANCE AND ARBITRATION PROVISIONS 88 (1950).
54. For a discussion of management prerogatives and labor's rights, See Note 4
WIESTERN REs. L. REV. 169 (1953).
55. "The problems of insecurity of employment are dealt with by those who are
most intimately affected and in a manner best suited to their particular needs ...
Thus, in many instances unions help employers to introduce new machinery and. methods
as in the mining and clothing industries, in return for which employers cooperate with
unions in minimizing the impact upon workers." Aaron, supra note 1, at 688.
56. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. No. 908-12, COLLEC-
TIV BABGAINING PROVISIONS, UNION AND MANAGEMENT FUNTIONS RIGHTS AND RE-
SPONSIBILITIES 3, 17 (1949). For similar restrictions on technological change see note
37 supra; U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. No. 908-10, COL-
LECTIVE BARGAINING PROVISIONS, UNION-MANAGEMENT COOPERATION, PLANT EFFICIENCY
AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 33, 36, 38 (1948).
57. Prohibition of plant relocation could probably be obtained only if the employer
did not fulfill his obligation to bargain. See discussion p. 395-96 supra.
58. The CIO has claimed that the cost to management of maintaining displaced
workers would be a deterrent to the irresponsible relocation of plants. Saturday Re-
view, Jan. 22, 1955, p. 20, 38.
59. 5 CCH LAB. L. REp. (4th ed.) 1 59923.072 (1955) (Ford Motor Co.-UAW
Contract).
NOTES 397
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wide basis.6" The provisions of the General Motors Corporation contract
are not as specific, but it is generally provided that in cases of major
technological displacement, employees may be transferred with full senior-
ity if they can qualify for a new job.6 If adequately articulated in the
contract and properly administered, broad seniority will usually be the
fairest and most orderly method of absorption. 2
Most contracts are silent on retraining obligations.6" Absorption
procedures which allow lateral transfer without requiring ready qualifi-
cations necessitates a retraining program. Transfer rights are ordinarily,
however, conditioned on skill and ability to perform the work.64 Thus,
the creation of new jobs for which previous experience does not qualify
the worker may force him to either become a part of the unskilled labor
force or terminate his employment. As a matter of company policy, long
service employees may be retrained for jobs at or near the same wage
level; the uncertainty of this guarantee, however, may. warrant contract
provisions on the subject.6"
Various forms of monetary payment for relieving the hardships of
displacement have been designed in recent years, and others have been
modified to reflect changing needs.66 Provisions for supplemental un-
employment compensation plans and severance pay have been important
additions to labor agreements. Besides providing a source of income,
supplemental unemployment compensation agreements are designed to
encourage management to plan industrial changes so as to avoid displace-
60. Id. at 59923.073.
61. 5 CCH LAB. L. REP. (4th ed.) IT 59905.43-.44 (1955) (General Motors Corp.-
UAW Contract).
62. Contracts sometimes provide for broadening of seniority in case of technological
change. "When changes in methods, products or policies would otherwise require the
permanent laying off of employees, the seniority of the displaced employees shall become
plant-wide. . . ." 5 CCH LAB. L. REP. (4th ed.) 1 59905.20 (1955) (General Motors
Corp.-UAW Contract).
63. One contract stated: "Nothing in this agreement shall be interpreted as
requiring the Company to train any employee for any job. . . ." However, the arbitrator
decided that if the employer voluntarily decided to train a worker he must consider
seniority in making the selection. Diamond Power Speciality Corp., 24 Lab. Arb. 60
(1955). See also Purolator Products Inc., 25 Lab. Arb. 60 (1955).
64. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. No. 908-10, COLLEc-
TIVE BARGAINING PROVISIONS, UNION-MANAGEMENT COOPERATION, PLANT EFFICIENY
AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 48-50 (1948).
65. Union leaders advocate that management obligate itself to retrain workers who
cannot be absorbed in the company to assist them in finding new work. The Wall Street
Journal, Oct. 18, 1955, p. 24, col. 1.
66. Baldwin and Shultz, Au¢tomation: A New Dimensim to Old Problems. 78
MONTHLY LAB. REV. 165, 168 (1955). Some Labor spokesman recommend pensions for
workers if the size of the labor force needs to be cut down. The Wall Street Journal,
Oct. 18, 1955, p. 24, col. 1.
NOTES
ment of workers. 7 These. plans usually provide greater benefits for the
long service employee,6" thereby encouraging the employer to consider
the absorption and retraining of senior workers. Severance pay, provided
to carry a permanently displaced worker over his period of unemployment
or to compensate him for loss of job rights,69 also serves to encourage
planning which avoids displacement. These principles are illustrated by
the U. S. Steel Company contract which allows severance pay only in the
event that a terminated employee had three years seniority and was not
able to exercise his bumping rights to retain a job." If the company
offers the employee a job of the -same class in the same general locality,
he may elect between the transfer or the separation and severance pay.
The amount of the severance payment is increased according to length
of service and is, most frequently, unavailable to employees who do not
have a substantial period of service." This is also true with respect to
other forms of monetary payment." Insofar as this class of employees
corresponds with the class affected by displacement, these contract bene-
fits do not aid in solving displacement problems."
In view of the difficulty in drafting agreements which anticipate
every problem likely to arise out of a displacement situation, the success
of labor and management in achieving a harmonious resolution of the
difficult problems depends upon management's willingness to recognize
that responsibility for solutions must be shared with the employees' rep-
resentative."' The decision to make major changes is clearly a manage-
ment function but one which so profoundly affects employee status under
67. Harris, Economics of the Guaranteed Wage, 78 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 159, 161(1955).
68. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. No. 908-15, COLLEC-
TIVE BARGAINING PROVISIONS, GUARANTEED EMPLOYMENT AND WAGE PLANS 29-30 (1950).
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PROVISIONS 34-36 (1948).
70. 5 CCH LAB. L. REP. (4th ed.) ff 59908.76-.81 (1954) (United States Steel
Corp.-USW Contract). A similar plan is found in the contract between American Woolen
Co. and the CIO Textile Workers. Id. at 1 59932.22. But compensation is paid only when
the displacement results from technological change. Ibid.
71. See note 69 supra, at 45.
72. Low seniority workers complained that, under one supplemental unemployment
compensation plan, they would have to work 173 weeks in order to obtain the 26 weeks
maximum coverage. Fortune, Aug. 1955, p. 55. See also note 68 supra.
73. Most employers would feel a greater obligation toward long service employees.
If there are limited funds available for these benefits, senior workers may suffer if
junior workers deplete the funds. Senior workers may have missed out on a wage
increase in order to establish supplemental compensation funds which will most benefit
the junior worker. Harris, supra note 67.
74. For one analysis of the attitudes which exist in union-management relations,
See HARBISON AND COLEMAN, op. cit. supra note 16. For a survey of contract provisions,
See note 64 supra, at 1.
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the terms of the collective bargaining agreement that the labor represen-
tative is compelled to assert its interest in the manner in which the changes
are affected. 5
In this area of conflict between management prerogative and legiti-
mate objectives of labor there is an obvious need for establishing a process
to which the problems can be submitted. The GM-UAW contract pre-
serves management's prerogative to initiate industrial changes but, if
specific contract provisions fail to effectively absorb seniority employees,
the company is obligated to negotiate an "equitable solution" when the
changes would result in the permanent release of seniority workers."6 A
more controversial plan is the industrial council or operational joint com-
mittee composed of labor and management representatives.7 7 This group
is charged with responsibility for planning operations so as to accommo-
date the interests of management and labor. This approach is premised
upon management's belief that the success of the endeavor requires labor's
full participation."8 Obviously the mutual trust necessary to achieve this
relationship is not widely present."9 The resolution of these conflicting
interests is a problem of accommodation in the collective bargaining
process.8" A recognition of the fact that equally important interests exists
is a prerequisite to solution of the problems of worker displacement.
75. Phillip Murray's position has been stated as: "union policy stands forth as one
of unquestioning acceptance of technological change implemented by proper protection
for members, so far as may be possible from potentially adverse consequences." Selek-
man, supra note 1, at 385.
76. See note 61 supra.
77. See Note, 4 WESTERN RES. L. Rxv. 169, 171 (1953).
78. For a discussion of this type of labor-management relationship, See HARBISON
AND COLEMAN, op. cit. supra note 1, at 89-117. One critic has said that the former
president of the CIO had advocated the use of industry councils to govern industry.
Riesel, Walter Reuther: Where is He Goiig?, Town Journal, July 1955, p. 24, 60.
79. "Neither Ford, nor General Motors or Chrysler, has ever permitted the develop-
ment of labor-management committees to discuss production problems or to suggest
methods of improving production or operations. The independents have been much more
willing to engage in such activities, but the actual effect of such union participation on
actual policy decisions is certainly not great." Northrup, srupra note 7, at 173.
80. The degree to which this accommodation is effected depends on the extent
"management adjusts its policy and actions to meet the challenges of the union" and the
extent the "unions' policy and actions is conditioned by a concern for the economics and
organizational well-being of the company." HARBISON AND COLEMAN, op. cit. supra
note 16, at 118, 119.
